University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

6-16-1965

Los Angeles County v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Los Angeles County v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County 62 Cal.2d 839 (1965).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/567

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

June 1965]

Los ANGELES V. SUPERIOR COURT
[62 C.2d 839; 44 Cal.Rptr. 796. f02 P.2d 868]
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839

[L.A. No. 28426. In Bank. June 16, 1965.]

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; SHIRLEY M. HAWLEY, an Incompetent
Person, etc., Real Party in Interest.
[1] Counties-Torts: 1I0spitaJs-.Liability.-An action by a mental

patient against a county to recover for injuries allegedly resulting from negligent care in a county hospital was not
barred by former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6005, which relieved
public employees of liability only for the admission and detention of mentally ill persons pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code,
§§ 6000-6004; such sections were not concerned with the course
of treatment once treatment began and therefore did not provide immunity for negligent conduct in the course of treatment.
[2] HospitaJs-.Liability: Public Employees - Liability. - Former
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6005, relieving public employees from
liability for admission and detention of a mental patient to a
county hospital, merely codified in part the usual rule that
public employees were liable for torts committed while acting
in a ministerial capacity but not while acting in a discretionary
capacity.
IS] Counties-Torts: 1I0spitals-Liability.-A mental patient injured in a county hospital had a cause of action against the
county under a Supreme Court decision refusing to shield a
public body from liability for torts of its agents acting in a
ministerial capacity (Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55
Cal.2d 211 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457]), but the effect of
that decision was suspended by the 1961 moratorium legislation. (Civ. Code, § 22.3.)
[4J ld.-Torts: 1I0spitaJs-.Liability.-Gov. Code, §§ 810-996.6, concerning governmental immunity, do not eliminate a county's
responsibility for the negligence of its employees in treating
a mental patient, but provide that the county is not directly
liable (Gov. Code, § 854.8) and provide for the public entity's
[lJ Immunity from liability for damages in tort of state or
governmental unit or agency in operating hospital, note, 25 A.L.R.2d
203. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Counties, § 65; Hospitals and Asylums,
§§ 13-17; Am.Jnr., Counties (1st ed § 48); Hospitals and Asylums
(1st ed §§ 12-18).
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11J Counties, § 109;
Hospitals, § 8; [2, 5] Hospitals, § 8; Public Employees, § 9; [8 J
Constitutional Law, § 124; [9J Statutes, § 23; [12J Constitutional
Law, § 150.
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liability for any judgment based on a claim against a public
employee licensed in the healing arts for malpractice and
arising from an action or omission in the scope of his employment.
[6] Hospitals- Liability: Public Employees - Liability. - Gov.
Code, § 854.8, and other sections concerning governmental
immunity in regard to mental institutions reflect a policy to
provide immunity for diagnosing, treating, confining, and releasing the mentally ill, but make public entities and their
employees liable for injuries caused by negligent or wrongful
acts or omissions in administering or failing to administer
prescribed treatment or confinement.
[6] Counties-Torts: Hospitals-Liability.-The placing of a mental patient in soft restraints or the using of bedrails are steps
in administering a course of treatment, not in deciding whether
to treat her, and hospital employees of a public entity can be
held liable for negligence in such administrations and the public entity must pay any judgment against them according to the
prescribed procedure. (Gov. Code, §§ 825-825.6.)
[7] Id.-Torts: Hospitals-Liability.-Under Gov. Code, § 854.8,
subd. (d), a public entity cannot be directly sued to enforce its
liability for negligence; that subdivision refers to Gov. Code,
§§ 825-825.6, providing a procedure for public entities to pay
judgments against their employees licensed in the healing arts.
Thus, the remedies available against a public entity under
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211 [11 Cal.Rptr•.
89, 359 P.2d 457] are limited by such legislation.
,1
[8] Constitutional Law-Retrospective Laws-Vested Rights.With respect to retroactive application of a statute, there is
no constitutional basis for distinguishing statutory from common-law rights merely because of their origin; describing a
right as "vested" is merely conclusory.
[9] Statutes-Power to Make Statute Retroactive.-Though the
Legislature normally legislates prospectively, it can provide
for retroactive application of a statute when it has a reasonable basis for doing so.
[10] Counties-Torts: Hospitals-Liability.-Making Gov. Code,
§§ 810-996.6, governing the tort liability of government
agencies, apply retroactively to limit the right of recovery
against a public entity as determined by Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital Dist., 55_Ca1.2d 211 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457], is
constitutionally permissible as a reasonable solution to the
problems created by that decision where no unfairness results
from the retroactive application of the statutes.
[8J See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 223; Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 419 et seq.
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[l1a, 11b] ld.-Tortli: lIospitals-Liability,-Gov. ·Code, § 854.8,
providing that a public agency is liable for an injury- to a
person committed to a mental institution only after the liability
of specific public employees has been established, did not deny
equal protection of the laws to a' mental patient injured in a
county hospital on the ground that the county would have been
directly liable had the injury occurred in a medical ward
rather than a mental ward, where, in treating mental patients
as a class by themselves, the Legislature could appropriately
consider the special problems of diagnosis and treatment of
mental patients, the problems of excessive patient load in
public mental institutions, and the problems that may arise
as to the competency of the mentally ill as witnesses.

[12] Oonstitutional Law-Olassifieation-Legislative Discretion.The Legislature has broad discretion to make classifications,
and its decision will be upheld, unless the classification has no
reasonable relation to any proper legislative purpose.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County from taking further proceedings
in an action for damages for injury suffered as patient in
psychiatric unjt of county hospital. Writ granted.

'J
'.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Lloyd S. Davis,
Chief Trial Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Willard A. Shank,
Assistant Attorney General, Robert H. 0 'Brien, Deputy
Attorney General, Harry S. Fenton, Robert F. Carlson and
Kenneth G. Nellis as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Wise, Kilpatrick & Clayton and GeorgeE. Wise for neal
Party in Interest.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner, the County of Los Angeles,
seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial court from
proceeding further with an action brought by the real party
in interest, Shirley M. Hawley.l Mrs. Hawley filed her complaint on September 1, 1961, alleging that she suffered personal injuries caused by the negligence of employees of the
Los Angeles County Hospital. Only her action against the
lYra. Hawley, an incompetent, appearB by her husband as guardian ad
litem.
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county is involved in this proceeding. The action was nor;
brought to trial until November 25, 1964, because of the 1961::
moratorium established by Civil Code section 22.3 on causes:;
of action against public agencies. The county contends tha$.:
the action must be dismissed because it is barred by the 1968 'S
statutes governing the tort liability of public agencies. (Gov.-"
Code, §§ 810-895.8.)
"
The facts are stipulated. On September 4, 1960, Mrs. Haw# :
ley was admitted to the Los Angeles County Hospital for
barbiturate intoxication and alcoholism. On September 5,
one of the, attending physicians ordered that she be placed ;
in "soft restraints," that is, a tying of the hands to prevent'
injury to the patient. On September 6, a staff psychiatrist ~
examined her, found that she had a "probably infantile ','
personality," and recommended her transfer to the psy.. ~:
chiatric unit for observation. A health officer then applied,
for her emergency admission to the psychiatric unit on the ,.~
ground that she was mentally ill and therefore likely to injure'
herself or others if not immediately hospitalized. (Welf. &,
Inst. Code, § 5050.3.) At about 4 p.m. on September 6, she';
was moved from the medical unit to the psychiatric unit. At
about 5 p.m., while in the admitting room of the psychiatric ,~,
unit, she fell from her bed and allegedly suffered a severe
brain injury. A registered nurse was present and in charge'
of the admitting room. Mrs. Hawley was not being restrained'
with soft restraints or otherwise, and no bedrails were being,:
used.
At the time of the injury, in September 1960, Mrs. Hawley:
could not have recovered against tbe county because of the ;'
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. (TaZZey vJ'
Northern San Diego Hosp. Dist., 41 Ca1.2d 33 (257 P.2d
22].) [1] The county contends that she would also have
been barred by section 6005 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. This contention is without merit. Section 6005
, provided: "Any superintendent or person in charge of the .
county psychopathic hospital, and any public officer, public ;
employee, or public physician who either admits, causes to
be admitted, delivers or assists in delivering, detains, cares
for, or treats, or assists in detaining, caring for or treating,
any person pursuant to this chapter shall not be rendered
liable thereby either civilly or criminally.' '2 Section 6005
relieves public employees of liability only for activity done i
2In 1963, the seetion was IImended to provide only for criminal immunity.
Civil immunity is now governed by Government Code sections 854·856.4. .

)
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"pursuant to this chapter," and the chapter provides only
for procedures of admission and detention of mentally ill
persons. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6000-6004.) Nothing in the
chapter is concerned with the course of treatment once treatment has begun, and the section therefore does not provide
immunity for negligent conduct in the course of treatment.
[2] It merely codifies in part the usual rule of liability of
public employees: they are liable for torts committed while
acting in a ministerial capacity but not while acting in a
discretionary capacity. (Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary
School Dist., 55 Ca1.2d 224, 229 [11 Cal.Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d
465].)
[3] In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211
[11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457], this court held that the rule
of governmental immunity _that would "-ave - barred Mrs.
HawlElY at the time of the injury could nu longer
invoked
to shield a public body from liability for the torts 01 its agents
who acted in a ministerial capacity. Mrs. Hawley thus had a
cause of action against the county under Muskopf, but the
effect of that decision was suspended hy the enactment of
the moratorium legislation of 1961. (Civ. Code, § 22.3;
Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 488, 493495 [20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325].) [4] In 1963 the
Legislature added division 3.6 to the Government Code
(§§ 810-996.6) to deal comprehensively with the problem of
governmental immuuity. This legislation does not eliminate
the county's responsibility for the negligence of its employees
-in this case but provides that it is not directly liable to Mrs.
'Hawley.
.
Government Code section 854.8 provides: "(a) [E]xC('pt
as provided in [subdivision] ... (d) of this section, a public
entity is not liable for: ... (2) An injury to any person committed or admitted to a mental institution. . . . (d) Nothing
in this section exonerates a public employee from liability
for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful
act or omission.... [T]he public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1
of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public
employee licensed in one of the healing arts under Division 2
(commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Professions Code for malpractice arising from an act or omission
ill the scope of his employment.... " [6] This section and
other s('ctions concerning mental institutions reflect the policy
recommended by the Law Revision Commission. That policy

J.,
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provides immunity for diagnosing, treating, confining, and;:
releasing the mentally ill, but makes clear "that public en-!
tities and employees are liable for injuries caused by negligent "
or wrongful acts or omissions in administering or failing to1
administer prescribed treatment or confinement." (4 Cal.~·
Law Revision Com. Rep. 830; see Gov. Code, §§ 855.8, 856.)
[6] In this case, the placing of Mrs. Hawley in soft restraints or the using of bedrails are steps in administering
a course of treatment, not in the decision whether to treat
her. The employees can therefore be held liable for negligence
in such administration, and the "public entity shall pay"
any judgment against them according to the prescribed procedure. (Gov. Code, § § 825-825.6.)
[7] Under section 854.8, subdivision (d), the public entity cannot be directly sued to enforce its liability for negligence. That subdivision refers to article 4 of chapter 1,
part 2 (Gov. Code, §§ 825-825.6), which provides the procedure whereby public entities pay judgments against their
employees. First, however, there must be a judgment against·
an employee or employees licensed under division 2 of the
Business and Professions Code, such as doctors, nurses, and
psychiatric technicians. The 1963 legislation, therefore,
limits the remedies that were available under Muskopf by
making the county's liability solely derivative.
Mrs. Hawley contends, however, that the 1963 legislation
cannot be applied retroactively to restrict the county's lia- .
bility under Muskopf. She contends that although the Legislature can retroactively abrogate rights provided by statute,
it cannot retroactively change the common law to abrogate a .
"vested right." (See OaUet v .. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [290
P. 438J.) [8] We find no constitutional basis for distinguishing statutory from common-law rights merely because·
of their origin (see 5 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 526), and
describing a right as "vested" is merely conclusory. (Flournoy v. State of Oalifornia, 230 Cal.App.2d 520, 531 [41
Cal.Rptr. 190J.) We must consider instead the reasons advanced to justify retroactive application of a statute to determine if it is constitutionally permissible. [9] Although the
Legislature normally legislates prospectively, it can provide
for retroactive application of a statute if it has a reasonable
basis for d9ing so. [10] Here, the Legislature responded
to this court's abrogation of the common-law doctrine of
governmental immunity by enacting comprehensiw l('gislation to govern the liability of public employees and publj,'
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entities. It expressly made the legislation retroactive "to the
full extent that it constitutionally can be so applied" (Stats.
1963, ch. 1681, § 45, subd. (a); cf. Corning Hospital Dist.
V. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 488, 494 [20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370
P.2d 325] ; Callet V. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [290 P. 438]) to place
aU potential plaintiffs whose claims are not barred by the
statute of limitations on an equal footing. Retroactivity also
serves to clarify the fiscal responsibilities of public agencies
following the abrogation of governmental immunity, thus
preventing the uncertainties that would result if the scope
of their liability were left to case-by-case resolution in the
courts.
It is not unfair to apply the statute retroactively. Potential
plaintiffs who were injured before the Muskopf case was decided clearly could not have relied on that case. (Cf. Wells
Fargo & CO. V. City & County of San Francisco, 25 Ca1.2d
37 [152 P.2d 625] ; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Ca1.2d 54
[53 P.2d 952].) Moreover, it is purely speculative to assume
that other potential plaintiffs would have protected themselves in some way during the period between the Muskopf
decision and the moratorium legislation had they foreseen
statutory modification of that case. Indeed, to hold that the
Muskopf case created vested rights that could not be abrogated by the 1963 legislation would create a special class of
favored plaintiffs: those who had causes of action that were
not barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the
M 1lskopf decision but that would be barred by the 1963 legislation.a Such a holding would give unlimited retroactive
effect to the Muskopf case and no retroactive effect to the
1963 legislation. The Legislature, as well as the eourt, however, is competent to define the retroactive scope of an overruling decision. (Forster ShipbZdg. Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, 54 Ca1.2d 450, 459 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736].)
If it adopts a reasonable solution to the problems created by
such a decision, as it has done here, its determination will
be upheld.
SThe dietum in Jone8 V. City of Los Angeles, 215 Ca1.App.2d 155, 156157 [30 Cal.Rptr. 124], referring to the cause of action as vested, could
only be referring to its continuation through the moratorium period. No
legislation had been passed at the time of that case, and nothing in
M'USkopf or in Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488
[20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325], supports a holding that the Legislature
cannot constitutionally modify the rules of governmental i=unity reo
troactively. (See, e.g., Flournoy v. State of California, 8upra, 230 Cal.
App.2d 520; City of Burbank V. Superior Court, 231 Cal.App.2d 675,
682-683 [42 Cal.Rptr. 23].)
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[Ua] Mrs. Hawley contends, however, that section
denies her the equal protection of the laws on the ground'
that the county would be directly liable had she been injured;i
in a medical ward rather than a mental ward. (See U.S..)I
Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 11, 21; Cal. Const:;';,
art. IV, § 25.) [12] The Legislature has broad discretion 'I
in making classifications, and its decision will be upheld"
unless the classification has no reasonable relationship to any¥
proper legislative purpose. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of .\1
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489 [75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563]; .~
Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Ca1.2d 228l '~:it
233 [18 Cal.Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101].) rUb] In limiting ."
governmental liability for the operation of mental institu-·j
tions, the Legislature could appropriately consider the special
problems of diagnosis and treatment in the field of mental 'I~
illness, the problems of excessive patient load in public mental ~.•'.'
institutions that must take all patients committed to them,-~
and the problems that may arise with respect to the compe- -., .
tency of the mentally ill as witnesses. (See 4 Cal. Law Re- ]~
vision Com. Rep. 830; People v. McCaughan, 49 Ca1.2d409, '~
419-422 [317 P.2d 974].) We cannot say that such factors .~
are insufficient to justify the Legislature in treating mentaljli
patients as a class by themselves and in providing that only:: '
when they can establish the liability of specific public em:,
ployees should the public agency be liable to them."'"
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed.

JI

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J.,
and Burke, J., concurred.
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